We extend Goldberg's multi-server information-theoretic private information retrieval (PIR) with a suite of protocols for privacypreserving e-commerce. Our first protocol adds support for singlepayee tiered pricing, wherein users purchase database records without revealing the indices or prices of those records. Tiered pricing lets the seller set prices based on each user's status within the system; e.g., non-members may pay full price while members may receive a discounted rate. We then extend tiered pricing to support group-based access control lists with record-level granularity; this allows the servers to set access rights based on users' price tiers. Next, we show how to do some basic bookkeeping to implement a novel top-K replication strategy that enables the servers to construct bestsellers lists, which facilitate faster retrieval for these most popular records. Finally, we build on our bookkeeping functionality to support multiple payees, thus enabling several sellers to offer their digital goods through a common database while enabling the database servers to determine to what portion of revenues each seller is entitled. Our protocols maintain user anonymity in addition to query privacy; that is, queries do not leak information about the index or price of the record a user purchases, the price tier according to which the user pays, the user's remaining balance, or even whether the user has ever queried the database before. No other priced PIR or oblivious transfer protocol supports tiered pricing, access control lists, multiple payees, or top-K replication, whereas ours supports all of these features while preserving PIR's sublinear communication complexity. We have implemented our protocols as an add-on to Percy++, an open source implementation of Goldberg's PIR scheme. Measurements indicate that our protocols are practical for deployment in real-world e-commerce applications.
INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR) provides a means of querying a database without the database being able to learn any information about the query [22] . In multi-server PIR, database servers each possess a replica of the database and a user submits his query to some size-k (or larger) subset of these servers in such a way that no server (or coalition of servers up to some threshold t) can learn the user's query. One can view the database X as consisting of n bits organized into r records, each of size b = n/r bits. We follow the usual convention of specifying a PIR query by the index i of interest. Thus, in a PIR query, the user retrieves the record at index i without the servers learning any information about i. We note, however, that existing approaches allow one to build queries that are more expressive on top of this basic setup; for example, keyword-based lookups [21] or simple SQL queries [48] . Using these techniques in conjunction with the ideas in this paper is straightforward.
Existing multi-server PIR schemes offer information-theoretic privacy protection for the user's query, but they allow a dishonest user to obtain additional information, such as the record at index j = i, or the exclusive-or of some subset of records in the database [31] . However, for many real-world applications, protecting database privacy by preventing dishonest users from learning extra information about the database is advantageous. Examples abound in online sales of digital goods, such as a pay-per-download music store [1] where users must pay for each song they download, a pay-per-retrieval DNA database [17] , a stock-information database [31] , or a patent database [2] . In all of these practical situations, it is necessary to guarantee the seller of these digital goods that users learn exactly the database record of interest and nothing more. In some scenarios it may even be desirable to sell database records according to a tiered pricing plan whereby different users pay different prices for each record depending on, e.g., their membership status or geographic location.
Symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) [31] adds an additional restriction to PIR that prevents the user from learning information about any records except for the one he requested, thus addressing the need for simultaneous user and database privacy; however, no existing SPIR scheme supports both (tiered) recordlevel pricing and access control lists. Some oblivious transfer (OT) schemes [1, [17] [18] [19] offer one or the other of these functions, but no scheme in the literature provides them both. Moreover, OT schemes generally have no requirement for sublinear communication complexity, which renders them useless for online sales of some types of digital goods, such as multimedia data, where the bandwidth requirement is high. Some schemes even require the user to download an encrypted copy of the entire database (e.g., [17] [18] [19] ) and later purchase decryption keys for individual encrypted records. This allows one to amortize the cost of many transactions, but renders the scheme unsuitable for applications in which the contents of the database change frequently. Storing the database in an encrypted format also limits the usefulness of the database for other applications that need ready access to the cleartext data. Other OT-based schemes [1] require the database servers to store state information, such as the number of purchases made by a user, or his remaining balance, which might leak information about the user's queries or enable the server to link his purchases.
In this paper, we present a protocol that extends the open-source PIR scheme by Goldberg [33] to a priced symmetric private information retrieval (PSPIR) scheme offering tiered pricing with record-level granularity. Our initial PSPIR construction is a simple 'single payee' scheme wherein a single content provider (CP) sells digital goods through a distributed database and collects all proceeds from these sales. We then extend this simple scheme in three important ways. First, we introduce a slight modification to the protocol that enables the database servers to control access to individual records by implementing group-centric access control lists. Next, we propose a novel top-K replication strategy that makes it possible for the database servers to periodically identify and replicate the K most popular records to a smaller databasei.e., to construct a bestsellers list -thus facilitating more efficient retrieval for these most popular items. Finally, we show how to adapt the single-payee scheme to scenarios in which multiple (possibly competing) CPs sell their own digital goods through a common database and, using a distributed bookkeeping protocol, determine to what portion of the proceeds from these sales each seller is entitled. These enhancements provide a stronger and more realistic model of private information retrieval that enables e-commerce to coexist happily with strong privacy protection.
In our model, users belong to different pricing tiers and pay (perhaps different amounts) for each record; moreover, the database may require users to have explicit authorization to access some or all of the records in the database. In particular, tiered pricing logically groups users into different price tiers and allows the database to set the price and availability of each record with respect to each tier (a price tier is then roughly analogous with a group in the context of access control). Our approach enforces these constraints without revealing the user's price tier to the servers during a protocol run. Thus, when combined with an anonymous communications channel, our protocols maintain user anonymity in addition to query privacy; that is, the database servers do not learn any information about the identity nor the query of the user. More specifically, queries do not leak information about the index or price of the purchased record, the price tier according to which the user pays, the user's remaining balance, or even whether the user has ever queried the database before.
Outline.
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows: §2 introduces our system model, including our design goals and threat model, and an example use case for our scheme. §3 presents our notation and the basic building blocks we use in our protocols. Our main contribution follows in §4, where we describe each of our constructions in depth. In §5, we discuss our implementation and the results of some empirical performance evaluations we ran on it. We then proceed to differentiate our approach from related solutions in §6, and finally conclude the paper with a summary in §7.
SYSTEM MODEL
Our basic scenario consists of three parties: the user interested in purchasing digital goods, the server having a database containing potentially tens or hundreds of gigabytes of data that is divided into r records (or files), and the bank, an independent issuer of digital wallets (see below). We build our scheme from multi-server information-theoretic PIR; thus, the server is actually comprised of independent PIR servers that each hosts a complete replica of the database. Users submit their queries to any subset of at least k > /2 servers of their choosing. We associate one or more price lists p1, . . . , pT with the database, where there are T tiers and each price list specifies a price for each of the r individual records. For simplicity, we represent price lists by length-r vectors of nonnegative integers (or ⊥ to indicate that a record is unavailable in this price plan), although representations that are more efficient are typically possible and using one of these representations changes the protocols only superficially. Users' wallets are kept with any nonrerandomizable (one-show) anonymous credential scheme, such as that of Brands [10] or that of Au et al. [3] ; the wallet encodes as attributes a balance and the index π of the price list according to which the owner of that wallet must pay, called that user's price tier or simply his tier. (For example, one price tier might apply to members while another price tier might apply to non-members; in general, any number of tiers may exist, although a large number of tiers might adversely affect system performance.) The tier π is encoded in the credential in a special way: each wallet encodes a collection of T attributes x1, . . . , xT such that xi = 1 if i = π and xi = 0 otherwise. The bank initially issues each user with a wallet encoding the balance 0; users may charge their wallets at any time using, e.g., a prepaid credit card obtained via cash transaction from a grocery store. We make no assumptions regarding noncollusion between the bank and the database servers; indeed, it is not even required that the bank and database servers be different entities, although synchronization challenges may emerge in the case of a distributed bank. We do not discuss the full semantics of the bank, since this is not our focus in this paper and such details depend on the chosen credential system.
To query for the record at index β, the user must first prove that his wallet encodes sufficient funds to purchase that particular record according to his tier. To do so, the user must send his current wallet to each of at least k servers, which makes the task of detecting double spending particularly easy (via the pigeonhole principle) since the wallet is not rerandomizable and k > /2. Along with his query response, the user receives a cryptographically signed receipt encoding the price paid for the query and the wallet used to make the payment. The user then uses this receipt to refresh his wallet with the bank; i.e., to obtain a new wallet (which is unlinkable to his old wallet) encoding his new remaining balance. This refreshing step does not reveal any information to the bank about the user's (old or new) balance, his tier, or the price encoded in the receipt.
Before discussing our constructions in further detail, we first present our high-level design goals and our threat model, as well as some motivation by way of a simple example use case that uses our full suite of protocols.
Design goals
We are interested in enhancing Goldberg's PIR protocol to yield a scheme with the following properties.
Utility.
In addition to PIR's standard functionality, we seek to provide the database servers with the following capabilities.
Tiered pricing: Users pay predetermined amounts for each retrieved record. The system assigns each user to a price tier and the prices they pay depend on both this tier and the particular records they purchase.
Access control: The database servers may set the availability of each record with respect to users of each price tier.
Replication:
The database servers can dynamically learn which records are most popular without revealing information about individual users' query patterns. This allows popular records to be accessed at a lower computation and communication cost than their less popular counterparts.
Bookkeeping: A common database may sell records from multiple CPs while ensuring that each CP receives the correct share of profits based on sales of its own records.
Security and privacy.
Traditional databases can already offer all of the above functionality, and more. What makes our situation unique is that we wish to provide this functionality while offering strong privacy protection, both for users and for CPs.
Correctness: Users with sufficient funds and privileges can always retrieve a consistent copy of their desired record.
Query privacy: The database servers and bank learn no nontrivial information about the records accessed by a user.
User anonymity: The database servers and the bank learn only that 'some user with sufficient funds and privileges retrieved some record'; i.e., they learn no other information about a user's identity (including whether or not this user has previously queried the database), the price he pays for a record, or the past or present balance encoded in his wallet.
Database privacy: Dishonest users cannot learn any extra information about database records that they do not purchase.
Practicality.
Computational cost: Any increase in the computational cost of the underlying PIR scheme should be small and scale sublinearly in n and at most linearly in r.
Query size: The size of users' queries should increase by no more than a small multiplicative factor as compared to the underlying PIR scheme. Furthermore, the size of the query response should increase by no more than a small additive constant.
Round complexity: The protocols should add at most one additional round of interaction to the PIR protocol, per query.
Threat model
We consider a threat model in which users of the system are potentially malicious, while database servers and CPs (as well as the bank) are honest-but-curious (i.e., semi-honest); however, Goldberg's PIR scheme -and by extension, our own proposed scheme -is robust against some threshold of malicious database servers as well. Users of our system have obvious incentives for being malicious; for example, they may wish to learn about records that they cannot afford (or for which they simply do not want to pay), or to retrieve records for which they do not have authorization. Moreover, in e-commerce situations, unscrupulous competitors may try to subvert the bookkeeping and replication functionality by acting as users and submitting specially crafted, malformed queries. The system must provide the database servers with strong security guarantees against all such attacks.
Honest-but-curious database servers may collude among themselves (and the bank) to try to reveal the identity of a user, the price tier or balance encoded in his wallet, or the content of his queries. The system should be secure against attacks on user anonymity regardless of who may be colluding with whom, and should be secure against attacks on query privacy provided an honest majority exists among the database servers. 1 Malicious database servers may also try to compromise the integrity of the system by refusing to respond to user queries or by returning incorrect results in an effort to prevent a user from obtaining his desired record or a valid receipt. The system should be robust to some number of malicious database servers and should allow affected users to learn the identity of whichever servers misbehave. We do not consider the case of an actively malicious bank, but we do note that a fair exchange protocol such as the one proposed by Camenisch et al. [18] can also mitigate threats associated with a malicious bank.
We argue that our assumption of semi-honest database servers is realistic for many practical e-commerce scenarios, particularly in the multiple-payee variant of our protocol where the CPs themselves may host some or all of the database servers. In this setting, several distinct and possibly competing CPs cooperate to provide a value-added service to their customers (i.e., a privacy-preserving way to purchase their digital goods). On the one hand, the CPs have a vested interest in cooperating, since providing this service to their customers would otherwise be infeasible. On the other hand, competing CPs have an incentive not to divulge additional information about customer spending to one another, lest this information help the other CPs gain a competitive advantage over them.
A hypothetical use case
As a hypothetical use case to motivate our protocols, we consider an online seller of e-books akin to Amazon's Kindle Store. One can easily envision similar use cases for other online retailers (e.g., Google's Android Market); we consider an e-book store because the size of these increasingly popular digital goods makes them ideal candidates for distribution using PIR. In light of the Amazon's 2010 lawsuit against the state of North Carolina seeking to prevent the disclosure of customer purchase records [44] , we also feel it is especially fitting to demonstrate how our platform could replace Amazon's current e-book sales model to provide a more privacyfriendly experience for customers, and to mitigate the risk of such egregious attacks on privacy in the future.
Suppose a number of independent publishers wish to team up to form a privacy-preserving alternative to the Kindle Store, wherein users can purchase electronic copies of these publishers' books without revealing their identities or facilitating the construction of privacy-invasive dossiers detailing their purchasing habits. 2 Each publisher hosts a database server containing a replica of the entire e-book catalogue and users purchase e-books from this data-base using PSPIR. Periodically, (for example, weekly) the publishers cooperate to learn to what portion of the profits each is entitled. They also use this opportunity to determine the top-K best sellers, which they subsequently replicate to a smaller database to facilitate faster purchases of these books. Much like Amazon does with the Kindle Store [26] , the publishers can sell the same e-book to users that are registered in different geographical locations for different prices, thus enabling them to recoup costs associated with, e.g., service fees incurred by offering customers free 3G service to purchase their books from a mobile device.
BUILDING BLOCKS
This section introduces our notation and the cryptographic primitives that we use in our construction.
For notational convenience, we use δij to denote the well-known Kronecker delta function; that is, δij = 1 if i = j, and δij = 0 otherwise. We also define the complementary Kronecker delta function,δij = (1 − δij). We use Zm to denote the ring of integers modulo m (or the finite field of order m when m is prime); we will represent elements of Zm by elements of {0, . . . , m − 1}. Zm [x] denotes the ring of polynomials with coefficients in Zm, and (Zm) r the set of length-r vectors over Zm (and similarly for (Zm[x]) r ). We write a ∈R Zm to mean that a is selected uniformly at random from {0, . . . , m − 1}. The notation a b denotes concatenation (as strings) of values a and b. κ ∈ N is a parameter used to tune the soundness versus performance of certain zero-knowledge proofs.
Let G1, G2 and GT be cyclic groups of prime order q (which we shall express multiplicatively). We assume throughout the existence of a bilinear pairing function e : G1 × G2 → GT ; we also assume that g, h ∈ G1,ĝ ∈ G2 and gT, hT ∈ GT are known generators of their respective groups, where gT = e(g,ĝ) and hT = e(h,ĝ). The crucial property of e is that of bilinearity:
ab for all a, b ∈ Zq. If G1 = G2, the pairing is called symmetric; otherwise it is asymmetric. Elements of G1 in asymmetric pairings are shorter than in symmetric pairings. The pairing e we assume in this work is asymmetric.
Shamir secret sharing
We make extensive use of Shamir's polynomial secret sharing scheme [54] to share field elements among the servers. An element a ∈ Zq is shared by choosing a polynomial fa(x) = atx t + · · · + a1x + a ∈ Zq[x] with each non-constant coefficient ai ∈R Zq and the constant term equal to the shared value; server j's share of a is then fa(j) ∈ Zq. Any subset of at least t + 1 servers can cooperate to reconstruct a using Lagrange interpolation [45, Ch. 12] ; however, t or fewer colluding servers cannot deduce any nontrivial information about a. Such a scheme is called a (t + 1, )-threshold secret sharing scheme, since a threshold of at least t + 1 out of servers must cooperate to recover the secret value. In general, any choice of 0 < t < will suffice, however our top-K replication protocol requires that t ≤ ( − 1) /2 . We recommend t = ( − 1) /2 , which ensures that the protocols are secure whenever an honest majority exists among the servers. We write [a]q to denote a Shamir secret sharing of a ∈ Zq among the servers; that is, [a]q = fa(1), . . . , fa( ) where the j th component of this vector is known only to server j.
Computing with Shamir secret shares. 
Moreover, the product [a]q [b]q yields a (2t+1, )-threshold sharing of a · b; thus, when t ≤ ( − 1) /2 as we require above, the servers can still interpolate to recover this product.
It is possible to construct algorithms for more complex operations using the above facts; e.g., distributed pseudorandom number generation [4] , testing equality [25] , or evaluating order predicates [46] . Indeed, we implicitly use these more complex operations for top-K replication, but do not discuss them in depth. The interested reader can consult Nishide and Ohta's paper [46] for further details on how to implement them.
Goldberg's PIR scheme
Goldberg's PIR scheme [33] is a multi-server information-theoretic scheme with good support for query robustness against colluding servers. It provides a t-private v-Byzantine-robust k-out-ofscheme for 0 < t < k ≤ and v < k − √ kt protection. In other words, users submit their queries to at least k out of the servers, and the system can tolerate up to v servers being Byzantine (i.e., responding incorrectly) without inhibiting the ability of users to retrieve the correct record, and t servers colluding without compromising users' query privacy. The scheme also optionally supports τ -independence [30] , a property that prevents the database servers from learning the contents of the database with informationtheoretic protection against coalitions of up to τ servers.
The scheme structures the n-bit database X as an r × s matrix D over Zq, where r is the number of records, b is the size of each record (in bits), w = lg q is the word size, and s = b/w is the number of words per record. For minimal communication, b = √ wn. The user's query is a standard basis vector
r , which has all elements 0 except for index β where it is 1. The scheme uses Shamir secret sharing to split 1 β into k parts ρ1, . . . , ρ k , which the user sends to the respective PIR servers. A user queries for the record at index β by choosing a vector of r polynomials, f = f1, . . . , fr , each of degree (at most) t, with uniformly random coefficients from Zq for the non-constant terms. The constant term of fi is δ iβ . In addition, the user chooses k distinct server indices I1, . . . , I k and forms k vectors of Zq elements by evaluating f component-wise at the k respective indices; that is ρj = f1(Ij), . . . , fr(Ij) . The user forwards ρj to server Ij, while each server Ij computes an s-element vector Rj = ρj · D and returns it back to the user. Finally, the user computes the record at index β from the Rj by using Lagrange interpolation (and also Guruswami-Sudan list decoding [35] if some servers are Byzantine or malicious).
Threshold BLS signatures
The BLS signature scheme [8] is a 'short' signature scheme that uses a pairing function for signature verification. The signer's private signing key is a random integer x ∈ Zq, and the corresponding public verification key is (ĝ,ĝ x ) (recall thatĝ is a generator of G2). Given the signing key x and a message m, the signature is computed via σ = h x where h = hash(m) is a cryptographic hash of m; the verification equation is e(σ,ĝ) ?
= e(h,ĝ x ). We use the (k, )-threshold variant (and also the (k, k)-threshold variant) of BLS signatures; in both cases, the signing keys are evaluations of a polynomial of degree k − 1 and the master secret is the constant term of this polynomial. The user recombines signature shares via Lagrange interpolation in the exponent. Note that by publishing the individual 'verification key shares' of each signer, threshold BLS signatures provide some level of robustness against Byzantine signers since each signature share can also be verified independently by using the signer's public verification key share.
Polynomial commitments
Polynomial commitments [40] allow a prover to form constantsized commitments to polynomials in such a way that a verifier can later use these commitments to confirm evaluations of the committed polynomials without revealing any additional information about them. We use the PolyCommit DL construction of Kate et al. [40] , which provides unconditional hiding if the commitment is opened to at most t−1 evaluations (for a degree-t polynomial) and computational hiding under the discrete log (DL) assumption if the polynomial is opened at a t th point (t + 1 or more openings is sufficient to interpolate and thus recover the committed polynomial), as well as their PolyCommit Ped construction, which offers unconditional hiding even when t evaluations are revealed. Their constructions are based on the polynomial remainder theorem: if f is a polynomial, then the remainder obtained by dividing f (x) by x − r equals f (r); in other words, x − r divides f (x) − f (r). We describe how PolyCommit DL works, and refer the reader to [40] for details on the similar PolyCommit Ped construction. A commitment to the polynomial f (x) = atx
, where α is secret, g ∈ G1 is a generator, and all bases (as well asĝ andĝ α ) are part of the commitment scheme's public key. If PolyCommit Ped commitments are used, then the public key includes the additional values h α t , . . . , h α , h, where h ∈ G1 is a generator whose discrete logarithm with respect to g is unknown. To open an evaluation of f at x = r, the prover invokes CreateWitness (f, r), which outputs a polynomial commitment w to the quotient obtained upon division of f (x)−f (r) by x−r; the commitment w is called a witness. The verifier can confirm the claimed evaluation by checking if
true. Note that in [40] , polynomial commitments are constructed over a symmetric pairing, whereas in this work we construct our polynomial commitments over an asymmetric pairing, since we wish to reuse this pairing for short threshold BLS signatures. Much like traditional discrete logarithm commitments [27] and Pedersen commitments [52] , polynomial commitments are additively homomorphic and scalar multiplication of committed values can be computed by exponentiating the commitment by the scalar. We exploit both of these facts extensively in our protocols.
Zero-knowledge proofs
Our protocols employ several standard zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) from the literature: proofs of knowledge of a committed value [53] , range proofs [9] to prove that a committed value is nonnegative, proofs of knowledge of a discrete log representation of a number [11] , and proofs that a commitment opens to the product of the openings of two other commitments [20] . We refer the interested reader to the respective papers for more details on each of these proofs, or to [16] for a self-contained treatment of all of the aforementioned proofs. We also use some efficient batch proof techniques [6, 7] to achieve practicality in our protocols; the rest of this section describes these batch proofs.
3.5.1 Proving equality of 1-out-of-r discrete logs.
We combine the batch verification techniques of Bellare et al. [6, 7] with Cramer et al.'s [24] technique for proving the disjunction of two or more propositions to yield efficiently verifiable proofs of equality of 1-out-of-r discrete logarithms. That is, given bases g and h and two sets of inputs g1, g2, . . . , gr and h1, h2, . . . , hr, to prove the predicate r i=1 log g (gi) = log h (hi) without revealing which particular statements are true and which are false.
A detailed description of how to implement this proof is provided in Appendix A, and it is proved secure by Bellare et al. [ We introduce a new proof that allows one to efficiently prove that a vector of r commitments opens to an r-dimensional standard basis vector (i.e., a length-r vector containing a single 1 and the rest 0). Our proof uses a special case of the batch proof of equality of 1-out-of-r discrete logarithms from the previous section as a subroutine. In particular, we use the special case in which g1 = g2 = · · · = gr and the hi are all different, but log h γ (hi) = ai is known to the verifier, where γ is randomly chosen by the prover and unknown to the verifier. In our protocol, the prover actually wishes to prove to the verifier that the vector of polynomials committed to by a vector of polynomial commitments evaluate to a standard basis vector at x = 0. However, modifying our approach as described here to handle other types of commitments (e.g., Pedersen commitments) is straightforward and modifying it to handle different evaluation points is trivial.
Let a = a1, . . . , ar ∈R (Z2κ )
A detailed description of how to implement this proof is provided in Appendix B, and it is proved secure in the extended version of this paper [36, Appendix A].
Batch verification of evaluations of polynomial
commitments at a common point.
In [40] , Kate et al.
show how to open a single polynomial commitment to a set of evaluations at the same time with a single witness element, a technique they call batch opening. We flip this proof around and show how to verify the evaluations of a set of polynomial commitments at a single point, a technique we call batch verification. Batch verification can be either cooperative or noncooperative. The cooperative form of the protocol is interactive (though it can be made noninteractive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [28] ), and uses only a single witness element, while the noncooperative form is noninteractive and uses one witness element per commitment. As the name implies, the noncooperative form of batch verification does not require the prover's cooperation; i.e., only the verifier changes. In particular, the verifier combines all of the witnesses (and commitments) into a single witness (and commitment) at verification time to significantly reduce verification time at the cost of a negligible decrease in soundness.
A detailed description of how to implement cooperative batch verification is provided in Appendix C, and it is proved secure in the extended version of this paper [36, Appendix B].
CONSTRUCTIONS
We now describe the full details of our constructions. We develop our scheme incrementally in three steps. First, we describe how to convert Goldberg's multi-server PIR into SPIR. We then describe the basic single-payee PSPIR construction and show how to extend it to support access control lists. Finally, we discuss our approach to bookkeeping and use this to add support for top-K replication and to construct multiple-payee PSPIR.
Symmetric PIR construction
The first step in our construction is to convert Goldberg's PIR scheme into SPIR; that is, we augment the scheme to enforce the additional property that no query will ever reveal information about more than a single record, under some mild computational assumptions. This property implies that no coalition of users can use knowledge obtained from one or more PIR queries to learn any information about a record that they did not purchase in one of those queries. We accomplish this with the aforementioned proof that a vector of commitments opens to a standard basis vector. In particular, the user (querying servers with indices I1, . . . , I k for the record at index β using his current wallet, wallet) does the following:
r such that deg(fi) ≤ t and fi(0) = δ iβ , 2. computes a vector C of component-wise PolyCommit DL commitments to the polynomials in f , 3. computes k vectors ρj = f1(Ij), . . . , fr(Ij) of evaluations of the polynomials in f , and k witnesses wj that attest to the fact that the r evaluations in ρj are correct using cooperative batch verification (made noninteractive via FiatShamir), for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, 4. computes the set S of commitment values from the proof that the polynomials committed to in C open to a standard basis vector at x = 0, and 5. sends ( C, S, wallet, ρj, wj), to server Ij for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Note that each server receives different vectors of evaluation points and witnesses, but the same wallet and sets of commitments. Upon receiving these values, each server Ij 6. ensures that it has not seen wallet in an earlier query, 7. verifies that the evaluations in ρj are correct using cooperative batch verification (with witness wj),
8. computes a (k, )-threshold BLS signature share σj on the value C S wallet, and 9. sends σj to the user.
After receiving signature shares from each server, the user 10. combines σ1, . . . , σ k into a signature σ on C S wallet, 11. computes the challenge c = hash(σ) and uses this challenge to compute the set V of responses to complete the aforementioned proof that the polynomials committed to in C open to a standard basis vector at x = 0, and 12. sends (σ, V ) to server Ij for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Upon receipt of this response, each server Ij 13. verifies that σ is a valid signature on C S wallet, and 14. computes c = hash(σ) and checks if the responses in V are valid responses for this challenge.
Recall that in Goldberg's PIR scheme, the user recovers the record by Lagrange interpolation at the point x = 0. It is apparent that the above proof convinces the database servers that the query only reveals information about a single record when the responses are interpolated at the point x = 0, but we must also consider a clever user that chooses the polynomials in his query non-randomly. In this case, the polynomials might be chosen such that interpolating at some other point x = a reveals information about some other database record. This is unsurprising, since it is known that information-theoretic SPIR is impossible to achieve without some interaction between the servers, or a shared secret among them [31] . We thus introduce a shared secret key sk, known to all the servers but unknown to the users. (Note that the servers must already share a copy of the database, so requiring them to share an additional secret key is reasonable.) To prevent the above attack, server Ij 15. seeds a pseudorandom generator (PRG) with F sk ( C), where F is a pseudorandom function family, 16 . uses the PRG to generate a common pseudorandom nonce and appends it to the database as an ephemeral (r +1) th database record for this query, 3 17. uses the PRG to generate t − 1 random Zq elements from which it forms a common pseudorandom polynomial g ∈ Zq[x] of degree (at most) t with g(0) = 0,
18. computes and appends g(Ij) to ρj, and 19. encodes the query response exactly as in Goldberg's original construction. Note that when encoding the response, the servers include the ephemeral (r + 1) th record in the database, and also include their respective evaluations of the pseudorandom polynomial g in the query as if the user had submitted it as part of his original query.
This last set of steps effectively rerandomizes the user's query. The user decodes the responses to his rerandomized query in the usual way (see §3.2).
Note that this SPIR construction preserves the t-privacy and vByzantine-robustness properties of the underlying PIR protocol; however, our approach to rerandomizing user queries prevents us from inheriting the scheme's optional τ -independence property. Theorem 1. The above modifications convert Goldberg's multiserver information-theoretic PIR into multi-server SPIR. Query privacy is provided information theoretically against up to t − 1, and computationally against t (under the DL assumption), colluding servers; the database's privacy is protected computationally (under the t-SDH assumption [40] ).
The proof of this theorem is in the extended version of this paper [36, Appendix C].
Single-payee PSPIR
Next, we extend the above SPIR construction to single-payee PSPIR. To do this, we augment the protocol as follows. First, we have the user compute a commitment, called a receipt, that encodes the price of the requested record under the price tier encoded in his wallet. The user proves in zero-knowledge that the receipt is wellformed (i.e., that it encodes the correct price) and that the balance in his wallet is sufficient to purchase the record at that price; once convinced by this proof, the database servers issue a threshold BLS signature on the user's receipt and wallet. The user can later exchange his wallet and this signed receipt with the bank to retrieve a new wallet for use in a future transaction. We also discuss how a user can recharge the balance in his wallet, and then point out a simple trick that enables the servers to enforce access control lists with only a slight modification to the PSPIR protocol.
Proving sufficient funds and computing the receipt.
To compute the receipt, the user and each database server independently compute a commitment to the price of the record encoded in the user's query for each price tier. This is done by taking advantage of the homomorphic properties of polynomial commitments: each party computes the T polynomial commitments Pi = r j=1 C p ij j for 1 ≤ i ≤ T , where pij is the j th component of pi. (Recall that pi is the tier i price list.) Note that Pi is a commitment to a polynomial fP i = f · pi whose constant coefficient is equal to the price of record β in pi (i.e., fP i (0) = pπi). Next, the user 1. chooses γ0, γ1 ∈R Zq and computes the PolyCommit Ped commitment CP = Pπ(h α ) γ 1 h γ 0 , where π is the price tier encoded in wallet,
computes a Pedersen commitment Receipt
and the witness wP = g φ(α) h γ 1 where φ(x) is the quotient upon division of fP π (x) − fP π (0) by x − 0, 3. computes ΠP , a ZKP of knowledge of (x1, . . . , xT , b) and (γ0, γ1, p) such that CP = P
T , b − p ≥ 0, and wallet encodes attributes x1, . . . , xT and balance b, and 4. sends the tuple (CP , wP , Receipt P , ΠP ) to server Ij for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Upon receiving these values, each server Ij

verifies that the proof ΠP is correct, 6. checks if e(CP ,ĝ)
? = e(wP ,ĝ α ) · Receipt P , 7. computes a (k, )-threshold BLS signature share ςj on the value wallet Receipt P , and 8. sends ςj to the user.
If any verification step above fails, then the servers abort immediately; otherwise, the servers proceeds to process the user's query as usual. The user recombines the signature shares ςj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, to recover the signature ς on wallet Receipt P . Remark 1. To improve performance, our implementation of the above protocols (as described in [36, Appendix D]) diverges somewhat from the above descriptions. In particular, each of the ZKPs used in the SPIR construction are computed noninteractively using Fiat-Shamir, and the commitments and responses from this proof are transmitted to each server as early as possible, thus allowing the servers to begin verification before the user completes the proof. Then, instead of computing Receipt P noninteractively, each server issues a threshold BLS signature share on wallet, all common values from this proof, and all commitment values from the proof that Receipt P is valid; the user recombines these signature shares to produce a challenge value for this latter proof, then transmits the recombined signature and his responses to each server. This convinces the servers that they each saw the same wallet and query in the earlier SPIR proof.
Refreshing the wallet.
Before performing subsequent queries, the user must refresh his wallet with the bank. To do so, the user sends the tuple of values (ς, Receipt P , wallet) to the bank, who verifies that ς is a valid signature on wallet Receipt P . If so, the user and the bank run the credential issuing protocol for the credential system (see §2) that represents the wallet. At the end of this protocol, the user has a new unlinkable (even to the bank) wallet wallet encoding the same tier as wallet and a balance equal to the price committed to in Receipt P subtracted from the balance encoded in wallet. The user may similarly recharge his wallet with additional funds by first 'purchasing' a receipt that encodes a negative price using, for example, a prepaid credit card. Note that in this procedure, the bank does not learn the balance in the new or the old wallet, or the price encoded in the receipt; in fact, the bank cannot even distinguish between a user that is refreshing his wallet and one who is recharging it.
Supporting access control lists.
We now describe a simple modification to implement access control lists atop our PSPIR construction. The idea is to impose a maximum balance bmax on users' wallets, and then require all users to prove that their new balance does not exceed bmax each time they refresh or recharge their wallets with the bank. The bank will refuse to issue any wallet without such a proof, thus ensuring that no user's balance ever exceeds bmax. The remainder of the protocol remains unchanged, except that a price of ⊥ in pπ is treated as a price of bmax + 1, which, by our restriction above, no user can afford. Thus, this simple modification effectively prevents users in price tier π from purchasing any record marked as ⊥ in pπ.
Bookkeeping
This section discusses our approach to bookkeeping. At a high level, our idea uses the additive and multiplicative homomorphic properties of Shamir secret shares to maintain and compute on shares of aggregate counts of the number of times each database record is retrieved (and at what price). In Goldberg's original PIR construction, the database servers do not maintain any state information -the only information they store is the actual database contents. We augment the database with two additional columns of state information; i.e., we require the database servers to store two w-bit words of state (Shamir secret shares) per database record, which are the length-r vectors of shares cj = [c1]q, . . . , [cr]q and dj = [d1]q, . . . , [dr]q .
Our initial idea was for servers to maintain a running sum of all queries they witness between successive bookkeeping operations. Unfortunately, this naive solution requires all servers to be involved in all queries, since if server j aggregates a query but server j does not, their shares will be inconsistent and interpolate to an unpredictable value that does not reflect the actual number of queries per record. However, requiring all servers to participate in all queries hurts availability since the failure of a single database server would render the system inoperable. (It also hurts efficiency by requiring additional bandwidth and computational power be devoted to each query.) Moreover, even if all servers aggregate all queries, this only enables them to track the number of times each record is retrieved, but not the prices paid for them. We solve the first problem by having the user reveal which subset Q of database servers are involved in each query, and then use this knowledge to convert the Shamir secret shares into additive shares; therefore, all servers must be online to compute on the shared bookkeeping data, but they do not need to be online during every query. To solve the second problem, we have the user (querying for record β under price tier π) include the additional vector of shares j of (p πβ · 1 β ) along with his query. 5 The servers convert both vectors into additive shares and aggregate them into cj and dj, which are then vectors of shares of the number of times each record was retrieved, and the total price paid for those retrievals, respectively. After each bookkeeping operation, database server j reinitializes the auxiliary vectors cj and dj back to the length-r zero vector, chooses a new private signing key xj for BLS signature generation, and publishes the corresponding verification key (ĝ,ĝ x j ). By having each server choose its signing key independently, every subset Q of k servers has a unique public verification key pkQ for (k, k)-threshold BLS signatures; this key is easily computable using Q via the expression pkQ = I j ∈Q ĝ x I j λ Q,j mod q where
−1 mod q. Users then reveal Q during each query, and the servers append an unambiguous string representation of Q to the message resulting in the signature σ.
The servers accept the signature as valid if and only if verification succeeds using verification key pkQ, where Q is the set of servers encoded in the message. Similarly, the servers encode Q into the signature ς on the user's receipt, and the user transmits Q along with the receipt to the bank. This ensures that each server involved in a query sees a consistent set Q of other servers; however, a malicious user may still disrupt the bookkeeping process by neglecting to send the tuple (σ, V ) to any nontrivial subset of Q on Step 12 of the SPIR protocol. The servers that do receive (σ, V ) will aggregate the user's query into cj and dj, while those that do not will not (thus resulting in inconsistent shares among the servers in Q). We therefore rely on the bank to facilitate atomicity to the query aggregation process. Instead of returning the regular query response ρj ·D, the servers use the PRG (seeded with their shared secret and the user's wallet) to produce a common Zq element for blinding, Γ, and return ρj · D + Γ. When the user sends (ς, Q, wallet, Receipt P ) to the bank, the bank 1) verifies that ς is a valid signature on wallet Receipt P Q using pkQ, 2) computes and sends Γ to the user, and 3) notifies each server in Q that the transaction involving wallet is complete. At this point, all servers can safely update their aggregate shares.
Top-K replication.
Given the above modifications, supporting top-K replication is straightforward. When a query ( C, S, wallet, ρj, wj, Q) arrives at server Ij, it temporarily stores ρj. Upon notification of the query's success from the bank, server Ij accumulates the query by computing cj = cj + λQ,j · ρj.Computing the top-K records from these shares is then a straightforward application of Burkhart and Dimitropoulos' [14] privacy-preserving top-K (PPTK) algorithm. The algorithm outputs the top-K largest shares in cj without revealing any additional information about the value of any share. After the top K are revealed, the servers replicate these to a smaller database and reinitialize cj to the length-r zero vector.
Multiple-payee PSPIR.
Supporting multiple payees in the tiered pricing model is slightly more involved than is supporting top-K replication. Due to space constraints, we only address the simpler case of a single-tiered pricing scheme, and then briefly outline how to extend this approach to a system with multiple price tiers (and access control lists). Full de-tails of the more general construction are available in the extended version of this paper [36] .
The single-tier case simplifies the construction in two important ways: first, the user need not send or prove statements about the additional vector of shares j as above and, second, the servers only need to store a single additional column of auxiliary information. Consider the above PSPIR construction with a single price list p = p1, . . . , pr for all users, and a set of m CPs CP = {CP1, . . . , CPm}. For ease of presentation, we define r1 = 0 and rm+1 = r, and assume that CPi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) owns the records at indices ri + 1 through ri+1. The amount payable to CPi is then computed by summing the additive shares
With tiered pricing, the computation is conceptually similar but requires cooperation from the user. The user sends the vector of shares j described above along with his query. The server chooses a random length-r vector of challenges c ∈ (Zq) r (via Fiat
The user then proves that [ei]q = [0]q for i = π using a proof similar to the existing proof of correctness for the receipt. Once convinced, server j is convinced that j is a vector of commitments to the correct price, and can safely aggregate j into dj.
Bookkeeping frequency.
Bookkeeping necessarily leaks some information about user queries. In the extreme case, where only a single user queries the database between bookkeeping operations, bookkeeping may completely reveal that user's query. At the other end of the spectrum, when every record is accessed hundreds or thousands of times between bookkeeping operations, the information leakage is minimal and likely not at all invasive to any user's privacy. However, prolonging the period between bookkeeping limits its usefulness in the case of top-K replication, and may be economically unacceptable in the case of multiple-payee PSPIR. Thus, a great deal of discretion is necessary on the part of the database servers in determining how often to run the bookkeeping protocols. For databases with consistently high usage, a simple bookkeeping schedule such as once per week or once per month may suffice, whereas those databases with lower usage may need to wait until the servers answer some threshold number of queries. In general, the bookkeeping policy is highly dependent both on the characteristics of the database and the business logic of its operators. We leave an in-depth investigation of this privacy-utility tradeoff as an important area for future work.
IMPLEMENTATION & EVALUATION
We implemented the protocols described in this paper using Ben Lynn's Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) [43] library with Aniket Kate's PBCWrapper [39] package for C++ Wrapper classes, Victor Shoup's NTL [55] with the GNU Multi-Precision Arithmetic Library [29] for multi-precision arithmetic, and OpenSSL [50] for hash functions (we use SHA-256). All experiments use a value of κ = 40 for the soundness parameter. Our PSPIR implementation is built atop Ian Goldberg's implementation of his PIR protocols, Percy++ [32] . For our evaluation, we implemented the protocol as a standalone add-on to Percy++, but we will later integrate it with the Percy++ library. We used the BigInteger-based version of Martin Burkhart's SEPIA library [13] and his PPTK [14] . The percent compute time attributable to the PSPIR enhancements decreases monotonically from ≈ 86% for a 1 GB database down to ≈ 33% for a 44 GB database. Percy++ starts carrying the extra overhead of disk reads after a 28 GB database, which exceeds available RAM. The w = 8 plot shows the execution time for Percy++ using its performance-optimal parameter choices, whereas the w = 160 plot shows Percy++ with parameters needed to ensure the security of PSPIR. The Percy++ with PSPIR plot shows the combined cost of Percy++ with w = 160 and the PSPIR enhancements. Error bars are plotted for all data points, but are small and may therefore be difficult to see. For comparison, downloading a 44 GB database in OT-based schemes takes over 11 hours at 9 Mbps, which is the average Internet bandwidth in Canada and the US [49] .
Xeon E5420 2.50 GHz CPUs and 32 GB memory. The value of q (the order of the pairing groups and the modulus for the polynomial operations) was 160 bits long.
Experiments
We measured the performance of the PSPIR and top-K replication protocols for various values of the PIR parameters n (the size of the database), b (the size of each record in the database), k (the number of servers participating in each query), and t (the number of servers that can collude without affecting query privacy). Experiment 1. Our first experiment measures the computational overhead added to Percy++ by the PSPIR enhancements. We generated databases of sizes ranging from 1 GB to 44 GB containing random data and took measurements for both Percy++ and the Percy++ with PSPIR.
In Figure 1 , we plot the results for parameters k = 4, t = 2, and b = √ 160n, which is the communication-optimal record size for this PIR scheme. We observe that PSPIR results in a moderate increase in compute times, with the percent compute time attributable to the PSPIR enhancements decreasing monotonically from about 86% for a 1 GB database down to just 33% for a 44 GB database. The upward bump just before 30 GB marks the point after which the database no longer fits in available memory. From that point on, every query bears more overhead from disk reads. In terms of communication overhead, PSPIR increases Percy++'s query size, which is itself just k times the size of the retrieved record, by a multiplicative factor of about 5. However, it increases each server's response by only 46 bytes, which corresponds to two G1 elements (BLS signature shares).
The PSPIR compute time scales linearly with k and r = n/b. In our implementation, the cost is independent of t except for a one-time preprocessing step at the client. (The size of the longterm polynomial commitment public key and Percy++'s client-side compute time are also linear in t. This latter cost consistently accounted for less than one percent of overall compute time in our experiments.) The bottleneck operation for the client is computing commitments, while for the server it is processing the actual PIR query. In both cases, the bottleneck operation increases with r. Top-K replication or bucketization [47] can enable one to trade some privacy to support larger values of r with little to no additional compute time or communication overhead.
Experiment 2. Our next experiment evaluates the impact of top-K replication; i.e., it studies the performance gains for the users when all queries for the K most popular records go to the smaller replicated database. In this experiment, we assume that all records are physically replicated to a second set of database servers, thus increasing the maximum database size for which both the top-K and non-top-K records fit in physical memory. Alternatively, the database servers could simply publish a list of indices for the top-K records and allow users to perform PIR on just this subset of the database; this would result in identical performance when the entire database fits in physical memory and somewhat lower performance otherwise. All trials of the top-K experiment used a query distribution that we generated at random using a bounded Pareto distribution that satisfies the 80/20 rule; i.e., about 80% of queries are for just 20% of the database records, with the number of queries per record bounded between 0 and 10,000. As such, we use K = r/5 . We chose an 80/20 distribution because such distributions are commonly observed in the wild, but we emphasize that the actual performance gains that a database can expect from top-K replication is highly dependent on the underlying query distribution. Figure 2 plots the mean query execution time for top-K and non-top-K queries, as well as the average (amortized) cost per query when 80% of queries are top-K queries and 20% are not. Note that the average query execution time is well below that of Percy++ without PSPIR functionality (cf. Figure 1) .
We also measured the cost to the servers of actually computing the top-K using the SEPIA library. We found that using 160-bit secret shares results in poor performance compared to the benchmarks presented by Burkhart et al. [15] . Fortunately, in our case we can assert that all shared secrets are much smaller than q/2, which enables us to eliminate two-thirds of the computation in the bottleneck 'less than' computation. Furthermore, about 86% of the remaining computation time is spent generating random bit-wise secret shares modulo q. These random shares can be precomputed between top-K computations, resulting in a respectable 57 lessthan operations per second in our tests. This still leads to significant computation times to isolate the top-K using Burkhart et al.'s PPTK algorithm [14] when the database size is large; thus, we fur- The average query cost for the top-K replicated database ranges from just 51% that of an equivalent non-replicated database for a 1 GB database down to 36% for a 44 GB database. Error bars are plotted for all data points, but are small and may therefore be difficult to see.
ther optimize the algorithm by relaxing PPTK to a 'top-K-ish' algorithm. This reduces computation times quite significantly. For example, with a 1 GB database (r = 7328 records) and a bounded 80/20 Pareto distribution our modified PPTK takes an average of about 9700 comparisons (≈ 2.8 minutes) to find the top 19-21% of records, whereas standard PPTK takes about 14600 comparisons (≈ 4.2 minutes); for a 20 GB database (r = 32768 records) this figure is about 33500 comparisons (≈ 11.0 minutes) for our relaxed PPTK versus 137500 comparisons (≈ 40.2 minutes) for standard PPTK, and for a 44 GB database (r = 48603 records) it is about 48605 comparisons (≈ 14.2 minutes) for our relaxed PPTK versus 197500 comparisons (≈ 57.7 minutes) for standard PPTK. Moreover, a large fraction of trials with standard PPTK had no solution (i.e., no unique top-K) and the algorithm therefore returned only the top-K-ish anyhow. Note that we generated our test sets using a bounded 80/20 Pareto distribution and then used the CDF for this distribution as an 'initial guess' in the PPTK algorithm. In practice, such an accurate guess will typically not be available and the actual number of comparisons will be greater than our predictions. Nonetheless, we feel confident in concluding that even for large databases with imperfect knowledge of the underlying query distribution, the cost of computing the top-K will be quite reasonable.
RELATED WORK
The related bodies of work are symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR), oblivious transfer (OT), OT with access control (OTAC), and priced OT (POT).
OT schemes allow a database X consisting of two records and a user holding an index i ∈ {0, 1} to run a protocol that results in the user learning the i th record and no information the (1 − i) th record, while the database learns nothing about i. Unlike PIR and SPIR, however, OT schemes have no sublinear communication requirements. Brassard et al. [12] considered the more general notion of 1-out-of-n OT, where the database holds n records and the user learns the record at index i, and learns nothing about the remaining n − 1 records [51] ; the database still learns nothing about i. SPIR schemes [31] address the honest-user assumption of PIR by additionally preserving database privacy so that dishonest users cannot learn any information about other database records beyond the record retrieved. All existing communication-efficient 1-out-ofn OT schemes are essentially single-server SPIR, whereas all existing communication-efficient distributed OT schemes [31] (i.e., two or more servers) of 1-out-of-n OT schemes are essentially multi-server SPIR. The first work on preserving database privacy against dishonest users in a multi-server PIR setting was by Gertner et al. [31] . They propose a single-round -server SPIR scheme with communication complexity O(log n · n 1/(2 −1) ) for ≥ 2 and a O(log n)-server scheme with communication complexity O(log 2 n · log log n). Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [42] briefly discuss how to convert their single-server PIR into SPIR using general zero-knowledge proof techniques, however they propose no concrete constructions. No existing SPIR scheme simultaneously provides support for both access control and tiered pricing.
Several OTAC schemes [17, 23, 57] were recently proposed. As with our approach, these schemes typically consist of three parties: user, database, and issuer. The issuer provides users needing access to the database with credentials encoding the access rights of users as an attribute set. The database encrypts its content under an access policy specific to each record and makes the encrypted contents available to users for download. A user with a valid credential can run the OTAC protocol with the database to obtain a decryption key for a particular record. After the protocol, the database learns that a user with a valid credential has obtained a key, but learns nothing about the user's credential or the decryption key issued. User's download the entire encrypted database and use the key obtained to decrypt the desired record. Zhang et al. [57] used attribute-based encryption to specify record-level access policies in disjunctive form without requiring duplication of database records. However, these schemes do not consider an economic model where users pay for each record and their high communication overhead makes them considerably more costly than SPIR.
POT schemes [1, 18] were originally introduced by Aiello et al. [1] to explore the difference between physical goods requiring close monitoring of inventory level and digital goods that are essentially of unlimited supply. In their model, users first deposit some money with the database and then proceed to buy multiple digital goods from the database, such that the total price of purchased goods does not exceed the user's deposit/balance. The database does not learn which digital goods the user has purchased. However, since the database tracks the users' accounts, all queries by a single user are linkable; thus, the approach lacks the anonymity properties that we seek. This enables the database server to deduce the number of digital goods a particular user has purchased, the average price of those purchases, and the user's spending pattern [18] . Furthermore, the scheme provides no way for users to recharge their balance, which means that when a user's balance becomes lower than the price of any record, the remaining balance is rendered useless. Camenisch et al. [18] address these problems by encoding users' wallets in an anonymous credential so that the database is no longer required to maintain user-specific state information; as a result, user purchases become unlinkable. They also lay out an extension that makes use of a trusted third party to facilitate a fair purchase protocol; i.e., an optimistic fair exchange protocol to prevent the database server from cheating by not sending the correct decryption key (or wallet) to the user.
All of the above priced and access-control-capable OT and SPIR schemes lack some ingredients necessary for deployment in a practical setting. The foremost missing ingredient is the right combination of functionalities for access control, tiered pricing, support for multiple payees, sublinear communication complexity, and availability of practical implementations. The SPIR schemes [31, 42] provide no pricing or access control functions. OT schemes (i.e., 1-out-of-n) have prohibitively expensive communication costs and require a static encrypted database, which potentially breaks other applications using the same database. In particular, existing OTAC schemes [17, 23, 57] do not provide pricing functions, while the POT schemes [1, 18] , on the other hand, provide no access control functions. Note that one cannot simply adopt our approach of setting the price of a record higher than the maximum wallet balance, since all users in these schemes pay according to the same price list (and thus would automatically have the same access privileges). Moreover, no existing POT scheme supports multiple payees selling goods through a common database.
Much like our top-K replication strategy, a few research efforts have also focused on increasing the practicality of PIR by finding ways around PIR's linear computational requirements. Beimel et al. [5] propose preprocessing, which enables PIR servers to answer queries with only sublinear computation by precomputing and storing some extra information (the size of which is polynomial in the database size n). Ishai et al. [37] propose a different approach called batch coding that -while still requiring linear computation -enables the servers to process several PIR queries by the same user simultaneously, thus providing an amortized cost per query that is strictly smaller than n. Nearest to our own work, Olumofin and Goldberg [47] recently proposed an approach to indexing and partitioning large databases into highly diverse bucket portions that users can query independently. This approach makes querying such large databases with PIR practical, and simplifies the tradeoff between privacy and runtime; however, it does not include any way for the database servers to dynamically learn about and exploit the relative popularities of individual records to improve performance, as does the top-K approach taken in this work.
CONCLUSION
We have extended Goldberg's multi-server information-theoretic PIR with a suite of protocols for privacy-preserving e-commerce. Our protocols add support for tiered pricing with multiple payees, group-based access control lists with record-level granularity, and dynamic top-K replication, while preserving the sublinear communication complexity of PIR; no other scheme for priced retrieval using PIR or OT supports tiered pricing, multiple payees, access control, or dynamic replication. We have implemented the singlepayee variant of our PSPIR protocol atop Percy++, an open-source implementation of Goldberg's PIR scheme, and evaluated its performance empirically. We also evaluated the cost and impact of top-K replication. Our measurements indicate that this combination of protocols results in performance that is acceptable for deployment in real-world e-commerce applications. Furthermore, the extensive functionality of our protocols, SPIR's sublinear communication costs, and the ability to operate on an unencrypted database, makes our approach more practical than competing OT-based approaches. For future work, we intend to optimize our implementation and add full support for multiple payees (which we do not expect to significantly alter the runtime), and to incorporate our protocols into Percy++.g
